In a coordinated remote attack, pagers used by hundreds of Hezbollah members detonated almost simultaneously in Lebanon and Syria on Tuesday, resulting in at least nine fatalities, including an 8-year-old girl, and injuring thousands more. The Iran-backed militant group has attributed these deadly explosions to Israel, suggesting a highly planned operation. The method of detonation remains unclear, and Israeli military officials have not commented on the incident.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had previously advised group members against carrying cellphones due to potential tracking by Israel, leading to the use of pagers for communication. According to a Hezbollah official, the exploded devices belonged to a newly adopted brand, which was not previously used by the group. The official, who requested anonymity, did not disclose the brand or supplier.
Nicholas Reese, an adjunct instructor at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and a former intelligence officer, suggested that cellphones pose a higher risk for intercepted communications compared to pagers. Reese also indicated that the attack would compel Hezbollah to alter their communication strategies, potentially discarding not just pagers but also phones and other electronic devices.
Several experts have speculated that the explosions resulted from supply-chain interference. It is believed that small explosive devices were embedded within the pagers before their delivery to Hezbollah and were triggered simultaneously, likely via a radio signal. Carlos Perez, director of security intelligence at TrustedSec, noted that the batteries in the pagers likely contained both explosive material and functional battery components.
A former British Army bomb disposal officer explained that an explosive device comprises five key components: a container, a battery, a triggering device, a detonator, and an explosive charge. Since pagers already contain at least three of these components, only the detonator and charge would need to be added. After reviewing security camera footage showing a pager detonation, two munitions experts concluded that the blast appeared to involve a small explosive device.
Sean Moorhouse, a former British Army officer and explosive ordnance disposal expert, noted that the scale and sophistication of the attack imply involvement by a state actor, with Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, the Mossad, being the most likely suspect due to the required resources for such an operation. N.R. Jenzen-Jones, director of Australian-based Armament Research Services, concurred, pointing to the level of sophistication and previous allegations against Israel for similar sabotage operations.
Experts suggest that planning for an attack of this magnitude would take several months to two years. According to Reese, executing such an attack required extensive intelligence gathering, building relationships to gain physical access to the pagers, developing the required technology, and confirming the targets were in possession of the devices. Elijah J. Magnier, a senior political risk analyst, reported that the pagers had been functioning normally for over six months and that an error message appeared to have triggered the explosions.
An alternative theory posits that malware could have compromised the pagers’ operating systems, causing battery overloads that resulted in bursts of flame. According to Hezbollah and Lebanese security officials, the pagers heated up before detonating in the pockets or hands of the victims. These pagers used lithium-ion batteries, which can reach extreme temperatures and potentially catch fire when overheated. However, several experts, including Alex Plitsas from the Atlantic Council, argue that the observed explosions resembled small explosive charges rather than battery fires.
The large-scale nature of the operation raises significant targeting concerns, as emphasized by Jenzen-Jones, questioning how the attackers ensured the devices did not harm unintended victims, such as children, at the time of detonation.